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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-2411
___________
EUSTACE SIMON,
Petitioner
v.
ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General,
Respondent
______________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A098-493-424)
Immigration Judge: Hon. Eugene Pugliese
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 12, 2011
___________
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: August 17, 2011)
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___________
OPINION
___________

GARTH, Circuit Judge:
Eustace Simon petitions this Court for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals‟ (BIA) denial of his motion
for reconsideration. We will grant Simon‟s petition for
review, and hold that the BIA abused its discretion in failing
to apply the principles set forth in In re Hashmi, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 785 (BIA 2009), to Simon‟s case. Accordingly, we will
vacate the order of removal, and will remand the matter to the
BIA to reconsider Simon‟s motion for a continuance under
Hashmi and In re Rajah, 25 I. & N. Dec. 127, 130 (BIA
2009).
I.
Simon is a native and citizen of Guyana who entered
the U.S. in 1994 on a tourist visa with permission to remain
for six months, and remained in the U.S. after that period.
Simon is presently the beneficiary of an approved I-130
immediate relative petition, and an approved I-140 work
petition.
Simon first appeared in Immigration Court in Newark,
New Jersey, on February 16, 2006. The Immigration Judge
granted an initial continuance to allow Simon to obtain
counsel and prepare his case, and thereafter granted three
more continuances. At a hearing on July 26, 2007, Simon
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provided proof that he had applied for adjustment of status
based on the approved petitions, but acknowledged that no
visa numbers were immediately available. Simon‟s attorney
asked for a continuance, which the Immigration Judge
granted. The Immigration Judge stated that if there was no
visa number available on the next court date, he would not
grant any further continuances, and informed counsel that
once a case had been pending for two years he would start to
get “little reminders” about the need to decide the delayed
matter. (A. 28.)
On February 7, 2008, the Immigration Judge held the
fifth and last hearing in Simon‟s case. At this time, there was
still no visa number available to Simon, and Simon sought a
further continuance or administrative closure of the removal
case until a visa number was available. In addition to proof
of his pending adjustment of status application, he provided
evidence of his family ties in the U.S., his good moral
character, community involvement, and financial information.
Counsel for DHS refused to agree to administrative closure of
the case, and the Immigration Judge refused any further
continuances and ordered Simon deported to Guyana.
Simon appealed the denial of his motion for a
continuance to the BIA, which dismissed the appeal on
September 23, 2009. The BIA upheld the Immigration
Judge‟s decision and found that “future availability of a visa
number is speculative and insufficient to establish good cause
for a continuance.” (A. 122.) The BIA did not address its
recent decision in Hashmi, filed in April 2009.
On October 21, 2009, Simon filed a motion to
reconsider, arguing that the BIA committed error by failing to
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address Hashmi. On April 19, 2010, the BIA denied Simon‟s
motion to reconsider, holding that the Hashmi factors were
not applicable because Simon could not establish prima facie
eligibility for adjustment: i.e., he could not establish that a
visa was immediately available. (A. 2.)
On May 18, 2010, Simon filed his petition for review
with this Court.
II.
In Hashmi, filed April 22, 2009, the BIA had set out
several factors that immigration judges should consider when
evaluating whether to grant a motion for a continuance where
the alien had a pending I-130 petition, which, if approved,
would render him prima facie eligible for adjustment of
status. 24 I. &. N. 785, 787 (BIA 2009).
In Hashmi, the BIA set forth five criteria to be
considered in evaluating whether to grant a motion to
continue removal proceedings pending an adjustment of
status application premised on a pending visa petition: “(1)
[T]he DHS response to the motion; (2) whether the
underlying visa petition is prima facie approvable; (3) the
respondent's statutory eligibility for adjustment of status; (4)
whether the respondent's application for adjustment merits a
favorable exercise of discretion; and (5) the reason for the
continuance and other procedural factors.” Id. at 790.
Factors relevant to determining the fourth criteria “include,
but are not limited to, the existence of family ties in the
United States; the length of the respondent‟s residence in the
United States; the hardship of traveling abroad, and the
respondent‟s immigration history.” Id. at 792.
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Significantly, Hashmi further stated that though the
Immigration Judge could consider procedural factors,
compliance with case completion goals was not a proper
factor to consider. Id. at 793-94. Additionally, the number
and length of prior continuances “are not alone
determinative.” Id. at 794. Finally, the BIA noted that the
Immigration Judge should “articulate, balance, and explain all
these relevant factors, and any others that may be applicable.”
Id.
In In re Rajah, decided November 12, 2009, the BIA
extended the Hashmi factors to employment-based visa
petitions, form I-140s. 25 I. & N. Dec. at 135-36. The BIA
also reemphasized that immigration judges should not rely
upon their completion goals in determining whether good
cause exists to grant a continuance. Id. at 136. Ultimately,
the focus is on the overall “likelihood of success on the
adjustment application.” Id. at 130.
Hashmi indicates that the third criteria, “statutory
eligibility for adjustment of status”—of which visa eligibility
is a part—is one of five criteria to be considered in the
calculus of whether to grant a motion for a continuance. See
24 I. &. N. at 791. Therefore, visa availability should never
be the one and only factor considered in a particular case. See
id. In Rajah, the BIA further indicated that visa availability
was one aspect to be considered when looking at the third
criterion. See 25 I. & N. Dec. at 132; see also id. at 136 (An
individual “may not be able to show good cause for a
continuance because visa availability is too remote,” but “the
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Immigration Judge must evaluate the individual facts and
circumstances relevant to each case.”) (emphasis added).1
Visa availability is one part of the Hashmi-Rajah
analysis. Once an immigration judge considers all of the
Hashmi-Rajah factors, including visa availability, he or she
has the discretion to deny a continuance where visa
availability is too speculative; but this should only be done
after all of the factors are considered. The BIA, in this
context as in others, must follow its own precedents, unless it
makes a reasoned determination to change or adapt its policy.
See Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 700 (3d Cir. 2002)
(The BIA “acts arbitrarily if it departs from its established
precedents without „announcing a principled reason‟ for the
departure.”) (internal citations omitted).
In Simon‟s case, the Immigration Judge relied upon
the remoteness of visa availability and upon timing
considerations—his “little reminders,” and the fact that
previously he had granted four continuances—to deny
1

Although this court suggested in Khan v. Att’y Gen.,
448 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2006), that the unavailability of a visa
alone may be sufficient to support an immigration judge‟s
refusal to continue proceedings, Simon‟s petition is factually
distinguishable from Khan. At the time Khan requested a
continuance of his removal proceedings, Khan‟s wife‟s labor
certificate had not yet been approved and no petition had been
filed on his behalf. Id. at 229. Further, in deciding Khan, this
Court did not yet have the benefit of the BIA‟s precedential
opinions in Hashmi and Rajah setting forth the factors
immigration judges should consider when adjudicating
motions to continue.
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Simon‟s motion. The BIA upheld the Immigration Judge‟s
denial largely based upon the remoteness of visa availability.
Neither the Immigration Judge nor the BIA ever analyzed
Simon‟s motion for a continuance pursuant to the HashmiRajah requirements.
Subsequently, the BIA stated in its order denying
Simon‟s motion for reconsideration that Hashmi did not apply
because Hashmi had a visa immediately available to him,
whereas Simon did not. However, as we have indicated, visa
unavailability is to be considered in conjunction with the
other Hashmi-Rajah factors. The BIA, having established the
principles in Hashmi and Rajah for granting continuances,
must apply those principles. See Johnson, 286 F.3d at 700.
The Hashmi-Rajah factors must be considered every time an
alien files a motion for a continuance based on an application
for adjustment of status premised on a pending or approved I130 or I-140 petition.
III.
We conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in
denying Simon‟s motion for reconsideration and in refusing
to apply the principles of Hashmi and Rajah to Simon‟s case.
We therefore grant the petition for review, we vacate the
removal order and the order of the BIA which denied Simon‟s
motion for reconsideration, and we remand to the BIA for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. If necessary,
the BIA should remand to the Immigration Judge for his
findings.
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